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T hucydides (5th Century B.C.E.) is arguably the first person to engage in systematic social measurement. 
His lone surviving masterwork. The Peloponnesian War, 
stands as a founding text for the disciplines of history 
and political science. On its surface, The Peloponnesian 
War comprehensively and objectively chronicles the 27 
year military struggle between Athens and Sparta from 
which the latter emerged victorious in 404 B.C.E. Yet 
Thucydides’ aim and approach in recounting the Pelo-
ponnesian War is extensively debated, often reflect-
ing enduring disagreements about the philosophy and 
methodology of social science. 
Thucydides the Person
We know little about Thucydides’ life beyond the 
few things he tells us in The Peloponnesian War itself. 
An Athenian citizen, Thucydides was probably born a 
few years prior to 460 B.C.E., likely dying shortly after 
the end of the Peloponnesian War. Perhaps significantly, 
we do know that he was elected to the office of general 
(strategos) in the eighth year of the war (424 B.C.E.) but 
then exiled from Athens shortly thereafter (for failing 
to prevent Sparta’s capture of the strategically impor-
tant city ofAmphipolis). Thucydides also tells us that he 
began work on his history at the war’s outset (11) and 
lived through its entire 27 years (II 65, V 26). He did not, 
however, live to complete the narrative, which breaks 
off abruptly in the autumn of 411, the 21st year of the 
conflict. 
Overview of the Work
Far from a single cohesive nation, ancient Greece in 
the 5th century B.C.E. was composed of dozens of in-
dependent city-states (poleis). Most of these states were, 
however, militarily subject to either Athens or Sparta, 
the two great powers in Greece at the time. At its most 
basic, therefore, the Peloponnesian War was a struggle 
for regional hegemony between these two powers: Al-
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Glossary
Alcibiades ► Athenian general initially chosen to lead the Sicilian expedition. He was recalled from the 
expedition and condemned to death by Athens, but he escaped to Sparta and helped them strategize against 
Athens toward the end of the war. 
Athens ►  The leading democratic city-state in ancient Greece, of which Thucydides was a citizen. 
Cleon  ► Vengeful Athenian general and rival of Thucydides whom Thucydides consistently portrays in a 
negative light. 
Melian dialogue  ► Diplomatic exchange presented by Thucydides in which Athenian ambassadors justify their 
subsequent slaughter of the male population of the island of Melos. 
Pericles  ► Creator of the Athenian empire and the leader of democratic Athens at the beginning of the 
Peloponnesian War. 
Sparta ► (Lacadæmon) The leading aristocratic city-state in ancient Greece; the eventual victor in the 
Peloponnesian War: 
The Peloponnesian War  ► A 27 year military conflict between Athens and Sparta that took place between 431 
and 404 B.C.E.
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though democratic Athens has exerted a greater influ-
ence on the thinking of Thucydides’ contemporary in-
terpreters than has aristocratic Sparta, the latter of these 
two powers was clearly the stronger at the war’s begin-
ning. Indeed, as Thucydides tells us, most Greeks ini-
tially believed that the Spartans and their allies would 
emerge victorious from the conflict within three years 
(VII 28). Sparta’s obvious military superiority on land, 
however, was offset by the supremacy of Athenian sea 
power, which prolonged the war and left its outcome 
uncertain until the fall of Athens and its empire. 
Book I of Thucydides’ chronicle features a wide- 
ranging “Archaeology” of Greek society and politics 
prior to the Peloponnesian War. As Thucydides re-
counts, the Athenians and Spartans had once been al-
lies, forming the Hellenic League in 481 B.C. E. in order 
to help all of Hellas rebuff a Persian invasion. Despite 
major victories against their common enemy, relations 
between the two powers were strained, eventually re-
sulting in the withdrawal of Sparta to lead its prewar al-
liance, the Peloponnesian League. The Athenians in turn 
created an alternative alliance, the Delian Confederacy, 
which accepted Megara, a defecting member of the Pelo-
ponnesian League. War broke out between the two alli-
ances in 460 and continued until 446, when both sides 
accepted a peace treaty. The remainder of the narrative 
commences with the broken peace of 431. 
From the beginning of Book II through the begin-
ning of Book V, Thucydides recounts the first, indecisive 
phase of the conflict often called the Archidamian war. 
While the Spartans regularly attacked the Attic country-
side, the Athenians responded by ravaging the Pelopon-
nesian coastline. In this 10-year period, the Athenians 
also suffered a plague, intervened in Sicily, and routed 
the Spartans at Pylos-Sphacteria; they subsequently lost 
important holdings in battles near Thrace. This phase of 
the war culminated with what was to be a 50-year peace 
treaty, the Peace of Nicias, in 421. 
The treaty, however, collapsed after only eight years 
(many of which were actually spent in open dispute). In 
415, the Athenians intervened a second time in Sicily, as-
sisting their allies, the Egestaeans, and attempting to ex-
pand their empire through the conquest of Syracuse, the 
preeminent Spartan ally in Sicily. The subject of Books 
VI–VII, the so-called Sicilian war, ended with a crush-
ing defeat for the Athenians. The effect of this defeat on 
Athens was all the more pronounced because it coin-
cided with the resumption of hostilities by the Spartans 
and their allies closer to home. Facing Spartan troops 
permanently based in the Attic countryside, an increas-
ing number of subjects in revolt, and hostile naval forces 
subsidized by their old enemy, Persia, the Athenians 
were overmatched. Despite these unfavorable circum-
stances, this final phase of the conflict, the Ionian or De-
clean war, lasted another 10 years. It ended, however, 
with the destruction of the Athenian navy in 405 and 
(after being starved into submission) the surrender of 
Athens in 404. 
Thucydidean Method
What exactly Thucydides hoped to achieve via his 
history of the Peloponnesian War has been endlessly de-
bated. Though some might make a claim for Herodotus, 
the more rigorous Thucydides is generally considered 
the inventor of descriptive history as such. Noting the 
absence of “romance” in his narrative, Thucydides avers 
that it might nonetheless “be judged useful by those in-
quirers who desire an exact knowledge of the past (I, 
22).” In turn, many have suggested that Thucydides’ 
aim is no more and no less than to provide an accurate 
empirical description of the events that he recounts. In-
deed, historians often remind us that Thucydides’ nar-
rative contains an astounding volume of painstaking 
detail, detail that Thucydides’ more social-scientifically 
inclined readers may ignore at their peril. Yet while we 
cannot underestimate the importance of Thucydides’ in-
vention of comprehensive historical description, social 
scientists are understandably drawn to the few “causal” 
or “explanatory” claims that he appears to be making 
throughout the work. 
Perhaps the most significant of these claims is Thucy-
dides’ famous comment about why the Peloponnesian 
War began: “The growth of the power of Athens, and 
the alarm which this inspired in Lacedæmon, made war 
inevitable” (I, 23). At first blush, this passage seems to 
imply that Thucydides possesses a broadly “material-
ist” view of empirical causation. Specifically, he seems 
to suggest that the onset of the Peloponnesian War is 
fully explained by the existence of a single, concrete and 
observable variable: namely, increasing Athenian power. 
To be sure, many have noted that an accurate measure-
ment of Athenian power proves elusive. In discussing 
the Peloponnesian War, as in other cases, debate among 
international relations scholars and military strategists 
abounds with disagreements over the degrees to which, 
e.g., population, wealth, geography, and munitions de-
termine a state’s “military capabilities,” and, in turn, 
over whether it is “absolute” or “relative” military capa-
bilities that are most significant. 
More important, however, this single sentence of 
The Peloponnesian War is characteristic of Thucydides’ 
occasional “editorial” statements in that it has likewise 
spawned more radical disagreement among his inter-
preters. Specifically, numerous scholars have noted 
that the most proximate cause of the war mentioned 
by Thucydides is not the material change in Athenian 
power, but rather, the more “ideational” variable of fear 
or “alarm” that this change inspired in Sparta. In other 
words, debate over this passage closely reflects de-
bate between idealist and materialist approaches to so-
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cial science in general (as evidenced most famously via 
Marx’s methodological critique of Hegel). Indeed, gen-
eration after generation of philosophers of social science 
have claimed a methodological pedigree from Thucy-
dides. Contemporary constructivist and postmodernist 
scholars, for example, argue that the onset of the Pelo-
ponnesian War is explained by the breakdown of so-
cial and diplomatic discourses in 5th Century Hellas. In 
point of fact, however, debate over Thucydides’ account 
of the onset of the Peloponnesian War provides only 
one example of how arguments about Thucydides re-
flect broader debates about social measurement. If any-
thing, Thucydides’ incomplete account of the outcome 
of the Peloponnesian war—that is, his account of why 
Athens loses—has proven still more suggestive to those 
interested in social-scientific theory and method. 
As noted, a purely materialist account of Athens’ 
defeat in the war is by no means difficult to construct. 
If we attend simply to the balance of power between 
the Spartan and Athenian sides, the fact that Athens 
avoided defeat as long as it did is arguably the greater 
mystery. Understandably, however, the balance of mil-
itary power between the two sides is by no means the 
only variable that scholars have noted as contributing to 
the war’s eventual outcome. 
Many of Thucydides’ interpreters, for example, 
stress the critical role in the conflict played by individ-
ual Athenian leaders. The charismatic Pericles is seen as 
crucial to Athens’ initial pursuit of empire, the venge-
ful Cleon blamed for the subsequent alienation of her 
subject states, the perplexing Alcibiades alternately cel-
ebrated and condemned for his role in the initiation 
and execution of the Sicilian expedition. Despite the no 
doubt significant role played by these individual citi-
zens, however, a still more common mode of explaining 
Athens’ defeat centers on the political context in which 
they came to power: namely, as leaders of the Athenian 
democracy. Even the most prominent defenders of the 
benefits of democracy in the conduct of foreign policy, 
including Michael Doyle, note that the experience of 
Athens during the war casts the demos in a not entirely 
favorable light: “It is here, in Thucydides’ History, that 
democracy first acquired its reputation for such disas-
trous factionalism” (79). In Athens, of course, the demos 
exercised much more direct control over foreign policy 
than it does in representative democracies today. More-
over, even insofar as it delegated some of this authority 
to the elected strategoi, Thucydides notes that the most 
jingoistic of these Athenian generals, such as Cleon, 
were often successful in appealing to what he seems to 
have regarded as the lowest common denominator of 
popular support. 
We return to the question of Thucydides’ moral 
stance in regard to the Athenian polity and its foreign 
policy in a moment. At present, it is enough to note that 
The Peloponnesian War raises many of the classic causal 
questions about whether a state’s system of government 
influences its foreign policy: Advocates of the “demo-
cratic peace” proposition, for example (sometimes called 
the one “iron law” of contemporary international rela-
tions scholarship) argue that even if Athens was belli-
cose in its relations with Sparta and other autocracies, 
it avoided conflict with democratic states. In contrast, 
those who see democracies as possessing a particularly 
pronounced tendency for the foolish overextension of 
empire have likewise found an early cautionary tale in 
Athens. Last but not least, scholars intrigued by the fact 
that modern democracies rarely lose the wars they en-
ter—the so-called “powerful pacifists” hypothesis—look 
back to the counterexample of Athens in hopes of deter-
mining whether anything inherent in democracy pre-
dicts its military success. 
Yet is it appropriate for scholars to cavort across the 
millennia in search of universal social-scientific laws? Is 
not everything that Thucydides says about democracy 
and foreign policy so wrapped up in a bygone social con-
text that to try and apply it to today’s world constitutes 
a fateful hubris? To argue as much is certainly credible, 
but, to claim that Thucydides himself would have made 
this argument strikes us as less so. For just as he can be 
claimed as the inventor of “ideographic” methods and 
“thick description,” so too can Thucydides be noted as 
the first researcher to possess a universalizing or “no-
mothetic” urge. He makes this evident, of course, in tell-
ing us that “the future … in the course of human things 
must resemble if it does not reflect [the past],” and in 
turn that, “In fine, I have written my work, not as an es-
say which is to win the applause of the moment, but as 
a possession for all time” (122). It is this justly famous 
remark, perhaps, that constitutes Thucydides’ most im-
portant and controversial contribution to the history of 
social measurement. 
Measurement and Morality
Even if Thucydides is attracted to the project of a no-
mothetic social science, however, this as yet tells us noth-
ing about how this may or may not comport with his 
other aims in writing The Peloponnesian War. He is, after 
all, read far less by methodologists than he is by politi-
cal theorists, and apart from the question of his empiri-
cal aims stands the question of what, if any, moral les-
son he wishes us to take from the narrative. Asking this 
question is interesting for various reasons. First, there is 
the possibility that Thucydides displays normative bias 
in recounting the events of the war, leading us to think 
twice about his status as an objective historian and so-
cial scientist. Alternatively, it could be that Thucydides 
felt that even an unbiased presentation of the facts of 
the war would lead the reader to certain moral or eth-
ical conclusions. But just what are Thucydides’ moral 
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and ethical commitments, if any? Many readers have 
seen Thucydides as the father of realpolitik, that is, of the 
view that morality and politics are incompatible. Such 
an ethos was, to be sure, frequently articulated in an-
cient Greece, as, for example, by some of Socrates’ more 
famous interlocutors. In Thucydides, realpolitik is most 
clearly defended by the Athenian ambassadors to Me-
los. For various reasons, however, most scholars now 
aver that Thucydides is little more sympathetic to these 
ambassadors than is Plato sympathetic to, e.g., Thrasy-
machus or Callicles. 
While the preceding section discussed the claim that 
Sparta began the war out of fear, Thucydides also notes 
that the Spartans were compelled by the Corinthians to 
oppose Athenian injustices at Potidæa (I, 71). The Athe-
nians, for their part, argued that they were obligated to 
acquire and expand their empire out of fear of external 
threats, despite the knowledge that to do so would re-
sult in widespread opprobrium. In addition to this line 
of thought, they also suggested that “honour and inter-
est afterwards came in” (I, 75). These claims, in addition 
to the Athenian assertion that they are uniquely entitled 
to rule others, serve as the ground upon which Thucy-
dides bases his discussion of Athens. 
The most famous defense of the ethical underpin-
nings of Athenian war aims comes from Pericles, in an 
oration for the war’s first fallen soldiers. He encourages 
the Athenians to love their city as the soldiers have and 
to be ready to make the same sacrifice should they be 
called on to do so (II, 43). Athens, he says, is so beauti-
ful and noble as to inspire love among its citizens, not 
merely because it is powerful but also because it acts for 
reasons beyond self-interest (either individual or collec-
tive). Arguably, however, this still falls well short of act-
ing justly. As David Bolotin points out, Pericles “boasts 
that Athens has everywhere established everlasting me-
morials of evils as well as goods … And when he speaks 
of everlasting memorials of evils and goods, he has in 
mind the evils that Athens has suffered as well as the 
harm it has done to others” (20). 
While Pericles may exaggerate the virtues of the 
Athenian people, Thucydides himself is often critical of 
the city in the post-Periclean era. At times, to be sure, 
Thucydides clearly approves of the workings of Athe-
nian democracy. After a lengthy siege succeeded in 
crushing a rebellion at Mytilene, the Athenians initially 
determined that all the male citizens should be pun-
ished with death, and the women and children sold into 
slavery (III, 36). A day after dispatching a ship to deliver 
the order, however, they experienced a change of heart 
and Thucydides gives a lengthy recounting of their sec-
ond debate, with speeches by his perennial rival Cleon, 
who favored the original decree, and Diodotus, who op-
posed it. In the end, the Athenians adopted the posi-
tion of Diodotus and hastily sent a second ship to pre-
vent the original order from being carried out (III, 49). 
As Michael Walzer observes, “It is the appeal to interest 
that triumphs—as has often been pointed out—though 
it should be remembered that the occasion for the ap-
peal was the repentance of the citizens. Moral anxiety, 
not political calculation, leads them to worry about the 
effectiveness of their decree” (9). 
In stark contrast, Thucydides provides no account of 
any democratic process leading to the decision to attack 
the island of Melos and, ultimately, to kill its male citi-
zens and enslave its women and children. Unlike Myt-
ilene, a former ally of Athens that rebelled and joined 
the Spartans, Melos had chosen to remain neutral until 
the Athenians violently encroached on their territory (V, 
84). All that is recorded, this time, is the exchange be-
tween the Athenian generals, Cleomedes and Tisias, and 
the Melian representatives prior to the official outbreak 
of hostilities. Here, the Athenians remove the notion of 
justice from the discussion at the very outset: 
For ourselves, we shall not trouble you with spe-
cious pretences—either of how we have a right to 
our empire because we overthrew the Mede, or are 
now attacking you because of wrong that you have 
done us—and make a long speech which would 
not be believed; and in return we hope that you, in-
stead of thinking to influence us by saying that you 
did not join the Lacedæmonians, although their colo-
nists, or that you have done us no wrong, will aim at 
what is feasible, holding in view the real sentiments 
of us both; for you know as well as we do that right, 
as the world goes, is in question only between equals 
in power, while the strong do what they can and the 
weak suffer what they must (V, 89). 
In the end, the Melians chose not to subject them-
selves to Athens and were besieged. After months of 
fighting, Melos was betrayed by a number of its citizens 
and yielded to the Athenians, who put to death all the 
men, and sold the women and children into slavery (V, 
116). According to Walzer, “We are to understand that 
Athens is no longer itself. Cleomedes and Tisias do not 
represent that noble people who fought the Persians in 
the name of freedom. … They represent instead the im-
perial decadence of the city state” (7). Whether or not 
the potential for imperial overreach was always present 
in Athenian democracy, however, it is eventually this 
imperial impulse that carries the day, ultimately leading 
to the ill-fated Sicilian expedition. 
What did Thucydides himself think of Athenian im-
perialism and this final campaign to extend it? Thucy-
dides clearly does not possess the outright aversion to 
imperialism that Walzer and most of the rest of us do 
today. He presents Pericles, the father of Athenian em-
pire, in a highly favorable light, and various commenta-
tors note grounds on which the Athenian empire would 
have been viewed as a progressive enterprise at the time. 
(It is, for example, generally agreed that the limited de-
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mocracy brought by Athenian rule was embraced by 
the lower classes in her subject cities.) Even if this is the 
case, however, it is unclear that Thucydides himself was 
sufficiently fond of the political system of post-Periclean 
Athens to advocate its export to other Greek states. 
In any case, a quite different account of Thucydides’ 
stance regarding Athenian imperialism suggests that he 
actually condemns it for being too hesitant. This read-
ing centers upon the mysterious destruction of the city’s 
statues of Hermae that occurred just prior to the Sicil-
ian expedition. The expedition was decided upon at a 
time of great factional conflict within Athens, and citi-
zens sympathetic to Alcibiades, the brilliant general 
chosen to lead the expedition, were widely blamed for 
the statues’ destruction. Eventually, this led to Alcibia-
des being stripped of his post. Thomas Pangle and Pe-
ter Ahrensdorf, among others, argue that the expedition 
might have succeeded were it not for this strange turn of 
events: “According to Thucydides, the Athenians could 
have conquered Sicily, and consequently could have 
won the war, if only they had retained the services of 
Alcibiades” (26). 
Such a reading returns us to a view of Thucydides as 
an advocate of realpolitik. That is, rather than responding 
to the mutilation of the Hermae with the cool rationality 
that Thucydides, it is argued, himself recommends, the 
Athenians took drastic action in the face of a religious 
crime that they also interpreted as a sign of divine dis-
pleasure with their imperial ambition. “It would seem,” 
Pangle and Ahrensdorf argue, “that the Athenians in-
terpret the mutilation of the Hermae not in the light of 
their own argument on justice and self-interest but in 
the light of their suspicion or fear that they are guilty of 
injustice” (27–28). Like much else in Thucydides, how-
ever, the suggestion that he sympathizes with Alcibia-
des is controversial: Alcibiades is likewise responsible 
for undoing the Peace of Nicias, and Nicias is perhaps 
the only figure for, whom Thucydides expresses even 
greater personal fondness. Commenting on his “unwar-
ranted butchering” during the war, Thucydides remarks 
that “of all the Hellenes in my time, [Nicias] least de-
served this fate, seeing that the whole course of his life 
had been regulated with strict attention to virtue” (VII, 
86). 
Many scholars thus point to Thucydides’ remark 
about Nicias, among other passages, as evidence that he 
views war as fundamentally tragic. While it would be 
a stretch to view Thucydides as a thoroughgoing paci-
fist, a case can certainly be made that he came to see 
the Peloponnesian War as a mistake—not just for Ath-
ens, but for all of Greece. Such a view is perhaps most 
strongly evidenced in Thucydides’ discussion of prewar 
Hellenic society and politics at the beginning of Book I. 
For here, Thucydides speaks less of Athens and Sparta 
than he does of the Pan-Hellenic “country” (I, 2) and 
“race” (I, 1). Indeed, on more than one occasion, Thucy-
dides seems to regret the fact that, except for during the 
war against Persia, the states of Greater Hellas proved 
“incapable of combination for great and national ends” 
(I, 15), much less of uniting in “a spontaneous combi-
nation of equals” (I, 16). While hardly a contemporary 
global citizen, then, it would seem that Thucydides is, 
like Socrates, drawn to the Pan-Hellenic ideal of coop-
eration and perhaps even confederation among Greek 
states (an ideal by no means uncommon in his time). 
Viewed from this perspective, The Peloponnesian War 
becomes a tragic story indeed, one in which an unwar-
ranted and essentially “civil” conflict slowly engulfs a 
divided Hellas. 
Conclusion
Obviously, we will never know exactly what sort of 
justice, if any, Thucydides felt that his native Athens 
owed to the rest of Greece and the world beyond. Nor, 
for that matter, will we know in what sense, if any, he 
thought it inevitable that states powerful enough to en-
gage in hegemonic war will do so. We should, perhaps, 
take seriously the possibility that Thucydides changed 
his views of these issues while writing a very long nar-
rative about a very long conflict. In any event, not only 
the diverse ethical thinking that Thucydides has in-
spired but also the numerous methods that he intro-
duced to social measurement will continue to prove im-
portant gifts to posterity. 
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